Muad'Dib's Submissions of the Appellant

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No. 143/09





  Anthony John Hill  





The first thing that needs to be clarified is that the Appellant does not submit to any Earthly jurisdiction, and has had to use the terminology “Submissions of the Appellant” because it is the recognized standard form and there is no other way to bring these supremely important matters to the attention of the Irish Nation, officially, on the record, except via their representatives in the Supreme Court of Ireland.


  1. On 2nd day of April 2009 the High Court (Peart J.) ordered the surrender of the Appellant to the United Kingdom on foot of an European arrest warrant to facilitate his prosecution for an offence described in the warrant as “doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice contrary to common law.”


  2. Two packages each containing DVDs entitled “7/7 Ripple Effect” and featuring widely available video-footage were sent to Kingston Crown Court in Surrey, England. One package containing 5 DVDs (delivered on 13th May 2008) was addressed to the foreman of the Jury and the other containing one DVD (delivered on 10th June 2008) was addressed to the presiding trial Judge. The EAW states that the DVD drew heavily from a BBC Panorama programme entitled “London under Attack” which sought to put London anti-terror plans to test and the thrust of the video is that the UK government and security forces conspired to cause explosions in Central London on 7th July 2005 and the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocent individuals duped into participating in what they thought was a training exercise.
  3. The packages which were posted in the Republic of Ireland were delivered by standard mail but did not reach the addressees as they were received and “intercepted” by court staff who informed the police. The subsequent police investigation indicated that the handwriting on the DVDs and the envelopes was that of the Appellant. The Affidavit of the arresting Garda Sergeant avers that the Applicant conceded that he had sent the DVDs because he believed the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocent.

  4. The Appellant appeals against the High Court Order for his surrender and he maintains that his surrender is prohibited by five distinct provisions of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003: in sections 37, 38 and 44. The Appellant’s surrender and prosecution is also prohibited because He has Sovereign Immunity from prosecution and surrender, by virtue of, amongst other things, the Preamble to the Irish Constitution; Article 6.1; Article 31.4; Article 34.5.1 - the Judge’s Oath; Article 44.1; Article 44.2.1.

    (i)         Breach of Constitutional rights. Section 37.

    (ii)        No crime has been committed. The prosecution is a malicious prosecution, fraudulent and politically motivated. Section 37.

    (iii)        Appellant’s body’s life would be in danger. Section 37.

    (iv)         “No corresponding offence”. The offence alleged in the body of the European arrest warrant does not correspond with an offence in this jurisdiction. Section 38.

    (v)         Ingredients of the alleged offence committed outside the issuing state. Section 44.

    (i) Breach of Constitutional Rights.

  5. Freedom of expression / Right to communicate:      
    The Appellant maintains that he is entitled to freely express his convictions and opinions and to communicate with others. There is no rule of law, legislative stipulation or other legal principle to warrant or otherwise justify the negating of that constitutional freedom in deference to a potential impact the exercise of that freedom might have on the justice system of another State.
  6. The available information suggests that the Appellant genuinely believes that the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocent. In that regard he simply posted packages in Ireland that contained DVDs with a thesis largely drawn from a BBC panorama programme. There is nothing in that state of affairs that constitutes a crime or justifies circumscribing his Constitutional and/or Convention freedoms.

    The Law – that is recognised by the State as being the Supreme Law of Ireland and thus superior to Common Law
    Bunreacht Na hÉireann: Article 40

    40.3.1°    The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.

    40.6.     The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality:
    i.       The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions.
    The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State.

    Bunreacht Na hÉireann: Article 44

    44.2.1° Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion (the bonded obligation to obey God [our conscience] not men*) are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.

    * The Holy Bible, New Testament, Acts of the Apostles 5:29 Then Peter and the [other] Apostles answered and said, “We ought to obey God [our conscience] rather than men”.

  7. European Convention on Human Rights.  
    Article 10

    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall  include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema  enterprises.
    2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary  in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection  of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

    The European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 provides:

    37.—(1) A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if—

    (a)  his or her surrender would be incompatible with the    State's  obligations under

            (i) the Convention, or

           (ii) the Protocols to the Convention,

    •  his or her surrender would constitute a contravention of                any provision of the Constitution (other than for the reason   that the offence specified in the European arrest warrant is an offence to which section 38 (1)(b) applies),

    Framework Decision.
    (12)     This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its constitutional rules relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media.

  8. The legal framework is quite clear. There is a fundamental Constitutional right to hold and express opinions and a constitutional right to communicate. Furthermore, there is a constitutional imperative and a duty upon the State to defend and vindicate those rights

    By Section 37 of the European Arrest Warrant Act the State has
     acted to defend and vindicate these rights by prohibiting 
     surrender where surrender would impinge upon a person’s
     constitutional rights or convention rights or fail to vindicate them.

  9. In Attorney General –v- Paperlink Ltd. [1984] ILRM 373, a case concerning the posting of letters, the defendant opposed the Attorney General’s application for an injunction to restrain it from conveying letters in breach of the Post Office Acts 1908-1969. The defendant argued that the restriction infringed the right of citizens to communicate with one another. Costello J. stated:

    It seems to me that as the act of communication is the exercise of such a basic human faculty that a right to communicate must inhere in the citizen by virtue of his human personality and must be guaranteed by the Constitution. But in what Article? The exercise of the right to communicate can take many forms and the right to express freely convictions and opinions is expressly provided for in Article 40.6.1° (i). But the activity which the defendants say is inhibited in this case is that of communication by letter and as this act may involve the communication of information and not merely the expression of convictions and opinions I do not think that the constitutional provision dealing with the right to express convictions and opinions is the source of the citizen's right to communicate. I conclude that the very general and basic human right to communicate which I am considering must be one of those personal unspecified rights of the citizen protected by Article 40.3.1°.

    A constitution which guarantees personal rights imposes co-relative constitutional duties on the State. In the case of those protected by Article 40.3.1° the duty imposed on the State is to guarantee in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the right to communicate. Considering the 1908 Act from the point of view of the defendants as citizens wishing to communicate by letter I fail to see how the Act infringes their constitutional rights. The 1908 Act does not prohibit them from delivering a letter themselves nor from employing someone else to deliver it for them and in fact by making provision for a nation-wide service for the delivery of letters facilitates the exercise of their rights.

    The Act, as has been pointed out, prohibits the activity of making a collection of letters for delivery to others but that prohibition does not in itself involve an interference with the citizen's right to communicate (whether it interferes with a right to do business is a question for separate consideration). Neither the enactment itself nor its mode of operation infringes in any way the basic right to communicate which the defendants enjoy.

  10. In Kearney –v- Minister for Justice [1986] I.R. 116, Costello J. again accepted that “the right to communicate” was protected by Article 40.3.

  11. In Murphy –v- Independent Radio and Television Commission[1999] 1 I.R. 12, Barrington J. delivering the judgement of this Court considered the right to communicate pursuant to Article 40.3 and the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 40.6.1 and accepted the right of the citizen to express his or her needs “by words and gestures as well as by rational discourse”.  He stated that the right to communicate

    ...must be one of the most basic rights of man. Next to the right to nurture it is hard to imagine any right more important to man’s survival. But in this context one is speaking of a right to convey one’s needs and emotions by words or gestures as well as by rational discourse.

  12. In Murray –v- Ireland [1985] IR 532 the State argued that the right of prisoners to beget children should be balanced against the right of the State to imprison them. Costello J. in the High Court deemed this argument to be conceptually unsound.

    It is common enough in every-day discussion on human and political rights to refer to the "right" of the State to punish, or to take life, or to expropriate property etc. However, the indiscriminate ascriptions of "rights" to the State can lead to confusion and is not appropriate when what is in issue is the exercise by one of the organs of government of a power conferred by law.

    This is the position in the present case. The Governor of Limerick prison is detaining the plaintiffs in custody, by virtue of a warrant issued by a court of law, after a finding of guilt in a criminal trial. The State, through the governor, is thus exercising a legal power to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to liberty. The court is, therefore, being asked to adjudicate on the validity of the exercise of a legal power and not on a conflict between the exercise of two competing rights. This distinction, between the exercise of a power and the exercise of a right, (a point emphasised by some legal theorists), is a useful one to bear in mind in the context of constitutional disputes. The Constitution, in protecting and guaranteeing the citizens' rights, has imposed very clear and specific correlative duties on the State to protect and vindicate them, but it has also designated the State the guardian of the common good and has empowered it to restrict those rights in certain circumstances. So, this is not a case in which the court should balance the so-called "right" of the State to imprison wrongdoers against the plaintiffs' right to beget children. The issue is, whether the restrictions on the plaintiffs' rights, caused by the exercise of the State's power to imprison the plaintiffs, are constitutionally permissible...

    "Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a 'retraction justified by the consideration underlying our penal system.'...

  13. In Herrity -v- Associated Newspapers [2008] IEHC 249  Dunne J. held that whilst in certain cases the right to privacy, which right was an unspecified right deriving from the Constitution, demanded an intervention of the courts, in general it was desirable that the legislature and not the courts should prescribe the exceptions to the right of freedom of speech.
  14. This Court in Mahon Tribunal –v- Keena [IESC 64] this Court noted that where, as in that case, fundamental rights are invoked as a restraint on the exercise of statutory powers, the courts are increasingly called upon to strike a balance.
    Fennelly J. analysed the High Court determination and observed:

    The Court reiterated the high order of importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society and that “the non-disclosure of journalistic sources enjoys unquestioned acceptance in our jurisprudence and interference in this area can only happen where the requirements of Article 10(2) as set out above are clearly met.”

    The Court addressed itself to the requirements of Article 10(2) of the Convention. It held that the order of the Tribunal was “prescribed by law.” Finally and most crucially, it had to ask whether the relief restricted “as it is now to simply a direction to answer questions, can be said to be necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence in this case” and concluded in the circumstances of this case..

    that the defendants’ privilege against disclosure of sources, is overwhelmingly outweighed by the pressing social need to preserve public confidence in the Tribunal and as there is no other means, by which this can be done other than the enquiry undertaken by the Tribunal, we are of opinion that the test “necessary in a democratic society” is satisfied.”

    Fennelly J. reviewed decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and concluded that the decision in Lingens –v- Austria   (1986) 87 EHRR 329showed the general approach of the Court:

    In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court cannot confine itself to considering the impugned court decisions in isolation; it must look at them in the light of the case as a whole, including the articles held against the applicant and the context in which they were written. The Court must determine whether the interference at issue was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the Austrian courts to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’.

    In this connection, the Court has to recall that freedom of expression, as secured in paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’.
  15. Unlike Murray, Paperlink et al, there is no State interest or “common good” aspect to justify the purported restriction placed upon the Appellant in this case, on the contrary, the Appellant acted in the “public interest” and the interest of fairness and justice. Furthermore there is no State power or other legislative provision that deserves to be balanced against the Appellant’s constitutional and convention rights as was the case in cases such as Mahon –v- Keena supra.
  16. In that regard, Peart J. does not make any distinction between what (and this is not conceded) might give rise to a legitimate balancing exercise between the Appellant’s constitutional rights and the interests of the State or the “common good” had the packages been directed at the justice system of this State rather than an alien jurisdiction. Nor does Peart J. identify why he felt it justifiable to interfere with the Appellant’s constitutional rights so as to his surrender exercising those rights. There is nothing contrary to Irish public interest to consider and therefore the Appellant’s constitutional rights and presumption of innocence reign absolute. Whereas before the High Court the Appellant argued that it was necessary to have regard to and make a distinction between any overriding restrictions that might pertain in this State vis-à-vis the facts of this case where it was sought to dilute the Appellant’s constitutional rights in deference to a purported public interest in another jurisdiction. However the High Court determined the issue in a perfunctory manner.
  17. Whereas as Fennelly J. stated in Mahon –v- Keena:

    Generally, therefore, restrictions on freedom of expression must be justified by an "overriding requirement in the public interest.”1

    No such overriding requirement was identified in this case and inadequate regard was had to the rights of the Appellant and his statement that it would be an unreasonable abridgment or curtailment of his right to hold and communicate his views for him to be surrendered.

    The High Court concluded that:

    There is no possible merit in this point of objection. It goes without saying that in certain circumstances and with proportionate restrictions, every citizen of, and other person in, this State enjoys freedom to express his views, religious or otherwise. But it is clearly recognised that this is not an absolute right to say what one wishes in all situations and to whom one chooses in all circumstances. Certain offences can be committed by the expression of certain extreme views, opinions and statements. Equally an expression or statement of opinion, which may not be considered to be extreme, but which is communicated to certain persons with a criminal intent or an objective which is contrary to law is an offence. Such expressions are prohibited by law, and it includes any statement or communication made to or with a jury foreman or a trial judge which is intended or designed or likely to influence the outcome of a trial. To so provide by law is a reasonable restriction on the freedom of expression. There is no basis in this case for the surrender of the respondent being prohibited on this ground.
  18. The difficulty with the rationale of the High Court under this head is that it purports to balance and thereby circumscribe the constitutional rights of the Appellant to communicate his views and opinions on the basis that “certain offences” can be committed by the expression of certain extreme views, opinions and statements or by the expression of any views communicated with a criminal intent or objective. However, there is no support for the contention that any extreme views were advanced in the DVDs or any finding of a criminal intent or objective on the part of the Appellant.       
    The only evidence of object is of a genuine belief on the part of the Appellant that those accused of carrying out the 7/7 bombings (and not those on trial) were innocent. The DVDs were lawfully sent to the court as an Amicus Curiae Brief* and there is no suggestion whatsoever of a desire to cause an injustice. More fundamentally, whereas it is accepted that in certain circumstances restrictions may be imposed on one’s constitutional rights in the interests of the common good, what was at issue here was the constitutional rights of the Appellant, acting in the common good and the interest of fairness and justice, vis-à-vis potentially influencing a court in another jurisdiction.


    The proscription on the Appellant in this case was imposed by a foreign State and the High Court Judge fell into error in treating that in identical terms to a proscription in the public interest imposed by the legislature, or even a proscription under common law, in this jurisdiction. Whatever about the situation were the Appellant alleged to have inappropriately interfered with courts in this jurisdiction, the communication that took place in this case was not prohibited as a matter of Irish law nor contrary to any Irish public interest. It thus deserved protection. There was no perversion of the course of justice here, or anywhere.  It is maintained that it is not for the Irish Courts to declare that an action carried out in this jurisdiction and which carries constitutional protection i.e. the right to communicate and freedom of expression, may be interfered with in the absence of clear and precise lawful authority to so interfere. 
    It is maintained that this is an issue of some considerable importance and which could have grave ramifications for free speech in this country.     
    For example, in an age of global communications what if an open internet letter had been posted in this jurisdiction on a website hosted in this jurisdiction through a server also hosted in this jurisdiction to the jury in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.           
    By virtue of the rationale of the High Court this would also be a communication which is not protected by free speech and would render the maker subject to surrender/extradition.  It is not fanciful to imagine other types of offences which by virtue of an expression of views on the internet (although lawful in this jurisdiction) render one liable to extradition e.g. insulting royalty or criticising governments where this is an offence in the other country.

    The High Court dismissed the objection of the Applicant under this heading out of hand and it is maintained that the claim of the Appellant deserved more expansive scrutiny. The acts complained of in the European Arrest Warrant were committed “in the Republic of Ireland” (sic). Surrender is therefore prohibited by the EAWA Section 38 (1)(a) for an act undertaken in Ireland, which is not an offence in this State. Section 37 provides for the exercise of such a right to express one’s views and to communicate in a clear and unhindered fashion. Had his objection received more thorough consideration the order for his surrender would not have been made. It is prohibited under sections 37 and 38 of the Act.
    (ii)             No crime was committed. The prosecution is a malicious prosecution, fraudulent and politically motivated.

  19. Peart J. erred by not viewing the contents of the 7/7 Ripple Effect DVD, because, had he done so, as requested and as he said he would do, he would have seen that no crime was committed and that this is a malicious-prosecution and politically-motivated to punish the Appellant for his political opinion, and for exposing the British establishment’s evil nature and crimes against its own and other peoples, including Irish victims (remember the Barron Report into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings, and the [alleged MI5] 1998 Omagh Bombing); with the assistance of their Israeli counterparts; for the whole world to see, in his film “7/7 Ripple Effect”.

    Peart J. erred in law by not then prohibiting the surrender of the Appellant under the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, Part 3, Prohibition on Surrender,
    Section 37 (1) continued:

    A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if—

    (c) there are reasonable grounds for believing that –

    (i) the European arrest warrant was issued in respect of the person for the purposes of facilitating his or her prosecution or punishment in the issuing state for reasons connected with his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinion or sexual orientation, or . . 
  20. There is ample evidence that the European Arrest Warrant was issued as a result of the political opinion expressed in “7/7 Ripple Effect”. The European Arrest Warrant vaguely describes the contents of the film, and falsely claims it could have perverted the course of justice in the trial of the three men accused of involvement in the London bombings 7th July 2005, who were on trial at Kingston Crown Court in 2008.

    “7/7 Ripple Effect” at no time mentions anything to do with those three men who were on trial.

    Proof of all of this can be ascertained by watching the video, as has been requested to be done by this court.

    Peart J. on March 19th 2009 said he would watch “7/7 Ripple Effect” before making his ruling. Then on April 2nd 2009 he said he had not watched “7/7 Ripple Effect”. In doing so Peart J. has failed to fully and to properly examine and scrutinise evidence that is vital in this case, as the European Arrest Warrant was issued based on the contents of the film.   

    Furthermore this failure to watch the DVD “7/7 Ripple Effect” is akin to writing a movie or book review based on the back page summary, but without watching or reading it. Therefore, by doing so, one could never fully assess and understand all of the small details and intricacies involved to properly gain a true and valid understanding of the subject matter.  For an Irish judge to act in this way is to violate a person’s right to a just and fair trial based on facts and evidence. Peart J. refused to look at the facts and evidence by watching the DVD “7/7 Ripple Effect”, but relied on the Issuing State’s biased summary, which is nothing but their own spin / interpretation of what the DVD “7/7 Ripple Effect” is about. 

    Peart J. stated in his judgement April 2nd 2009 that he had not viewed the video on the basis that to do so would “run the risk of entering upon the merits of the prosecution case” against the Appellant.  While at the same time Peart J. accepted that the summary of what the DVD was about contained in the Issuing State’s EAW, which the Minister's case is based upon, was all he needed to understand what the DVD was about. He stated that watching the film would clearly “run the risk of entering upon the merits of the prosecution case” against the Appellant. Yet Peart J. was prepared to and did accept this version / interpretation without ever watching and examining the content of the DVD. This shows a clear contradiction in the judgement given by Peart J and bias against the Appellant and favour towards the prosecution.  
    In accepting the summary of the DVD from the Issuing State, i.e. their biased interpretation of what they think the DVD is about, Peart J. entered upon the merits of the prosecution case. That summary was written by people who are seeking to prosecute the Appellant with the prospect of potentially life imprisonment, so clearly, to accept their summary version without examining it and without watching the DVD himself is entering upon the merits of the prosecution case, while at the same time claiming he did not watch the DVD in order to avoid this situation. 
    It would appear to be quite ironic that Peart J. created the opposite effect of what his said intention was, and thus it must be corrected by this court to ensure that this favour shown to the Minister is overturned by this court, by watching the DVD “7/7 Ripple Effect” with an open mind, i.e. without fear or favour, affection or ill-will towards either side in this case, as is stated in the Judge’s Oath of Office.

    European Arrest Warrant 2003, Part 3 Prohibition on Surrender

      (ii) in the prosecution or punishment of the person in the issuing state, he or she will be treated less favourably than a person who –

      (ll) does not hold the same political opinions as him or her,

      (iii) were the person to be surrendered to the issuing state –

      (ll) he or she would be tortured or subjected to other inhuman or degrading treatment.

    The issuing authority is a criminal organisation, that has no jurisdiction, and has been found guilty of facilitating extraordinary rendition and the torture of innocent British citizens.  Thus surrender is prohibited under the EAW Act, Part 3, above.

    This charge against the Appellant is clearly politically-motivated, fraudulent and is a criminally malicious-prosecution, contravening the constitutional right to express political opinion that is also guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10.1. Thus surrender is prohibited under the EAW Act, Part 3, above.
  21. For a crime to have been committed under Common Law there are two conditions that have to be satisfied, or there is NO crime:-

    1. There must be a victim.
    2. Harm and/or loss must have been caused to the victim.

    In this case there is no victim and there has been no harm or loss caused, therefore NO crime has been committed and the charge is not only malicious, but also fraudulent, for the former reasons and the following reason, and is a heinous and treasonous crime against the Appellant.

    The British “crown” is not only acting fraudulently by bringing this false and fraudulent charge against the Appellant, but also in fraudulently claiming to be the “crown”. As the “crown” is fraudulently and criminally claiming to be the Crown, which is a criminal enterprise, then any act that it commits is also fraudulent, criminal and thus not only null and void, but also punishable by law.

    Mrs. Elizabeth Battenberg/Mountbatten; unlawfully residing in Buckingham Palace, London; also known by the criminal aliases Windsor and QE2, was knowingly and willfully, with malice-aforethought, fraudulently crowned on a fake Coronation Stone / Lia Fail / Stone of Destiny in 1953; has broken her Coronation Oath on innumerable occasions; thus also nullifying the fraudulent coronation, and has been fraudulently masquerading as the rightful British Sovereign/Crown for the last 57 years, which the Appellant can prove beyond doubt, and is a major part of why the fraudulent British so-called “crown” is attacking the Appellant with this false, malicious charge and warrant. Mrs. E. Battenberg should be arrested for her innumerable acts of high-treason against God and Christ, whose church she claims to head.

    The fraudulent British so-called “crown”, which has no jurisdiction, then compounded their crimes by fraudulently applying, without jurisdiction, to the European Court for an European Arrest Warrant.

    In an effort to try to hide their crimes, and make it impossible for the Appellant to be able to defend himself, they then had their agents in the Dublin Extradition Branch of An Garda Siochána fraudulently, wrongfully arrest the Appellant, burgle his home and steal the Appellant’s computers, printer, ancilliary equipment and important documents that were not listed in the fraudulent arrest warrant; because they prove these facts to be true.

    (iii) Appellant’s body’s life would be in danger.

  22. The Appellant maintains that there are more than enough grounds to reasonsably believe, for the foregoing reasons, amongst others, that there is a great risk to his body’s life, and thus to the lives of all of mankind, if he is extradited to the U.K., because they are mass-murderers; they hate him; they have a “shoot-to-kill policy” and have already admitted to having shot and killed a number of innocent people whom the authorities have falsely and wrongfully accused of being terrorists; and the authorities have been found guilty of assisting in “extraordinary rendition” and the torture of innocent British citizens. Thus surrender is prohibited by the EAW Act.

    Please see the cases of Moazzam Begg and Binyam Mohamed and the ruling by the U.K. Court of Appeals for proof, and there are at least 15 other cases under investigation.

    The issuing authority can and do also imprison people for 42 days without charge, and can keep releasing and re-arresting anyone and thus detain them indefinitely without charging them.
  23. The Appellant maintains that He would not get a fair trial in the U.K., like the Guildford 4, the Birmingham 6, the Maguire 7 and countless others.
  24. The British government’s official propaganda organ, the BBC, has already made and broadcast a television programme (Conspiracy Files 7/7) publicly attacking the Appellant, thereby committing contempt of court in blackening His name, by inferring that He is a fugitive criminal, and this is further proof that He could not receive a fair trial from the fraudulent British “so-called” authorities in the U.K.
  25. Peart J. erred in law by not prohibiting the Appellant’s surrender under the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, Part 3, (ll) as quoted above.

    (iv) No corresponding offence.

  26. Section 38 of the Act prohibits surrender for offences not specified in Article 2.2 of the Framework Decision, (ticked offences) unless the ingredients of the offence, the acts or omissions alleged, correspond with an Irish offence.

    38.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), a person shall not be surrendered to an issuing state under this Act in respect of an offence unless—

    (a) the offence corresponds to an offence under the law of the State, and— ….

    Article 2 of the Framework Decision provides:
    (1.)  A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or,
    where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months...

    (4.) For offences other than those covered by paragraph 2, surrender may be subject to the condition that the acts for which the European arrest warrant has been issued constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or however it is described.2
  27. The single offence outlined in the warrant against the Appellant is not a “ticked offence” and thus for a valid surrender requires that the “correspondence” be demonstrated. Section 5 defines “correspondence” for the purposes of the Act.

    For the purposes of this Act, an offence specified in a European Arrest Warrant corresponds to an offence under the law of the State, where the act or omission that constitutes the offence so specified would, if committed in the State on the date on which the European arrest warrant is issued, constitute an offence under the law of the State.3

    The definition of “correspondence” is thus predicated on the basis that if the relevant alleged act or omission was committed in Ireland it would constitute an offence here. That requires an analysis of what was done.
  28. In Attorney General –v- Dyer4 this Court reviewed the authorities and endorsed the test for assessing “correspondence” as previously outlined in Hanlon –v- Fleming5

    The required correspondence of offences is not shown by the mere proof that the offence specified in the warrant has the same name as that of an offence in this State.

    It is the essential factual ingredients that determine whether two offences have the necessary correspondence. If an offence is specified in the warrant merely by the name by which it is known in the requesting State, it does not follow that because there is an offence in this State which goes by the same name, the two offences correspond with each other. They may be crucially different in essence. 6

    The [correspondence issue] raises the question whether the specified offence has the required correspondence with an offence under the law of this State. The relevant decisions of this Court, such as The State (Furlong) –v- Kelly, Wyatt –v- McLoughlin and Wilson –v- Sheehan show that it is a question of looking at the factual components of the offence specified in the warrant, regardless of the name given to it, and seeing if those factual components, in their entirety or in their near-entirety, would constitute an offence which, if committed in this State, could be said to be a corresponding offence of the required gravity.7
  29. In Attorney General –v- Hilton8 this Court examined Irish Law for a corresponding offence to “cheating the public revenue”:

    The test for determining “correspondence” when analysing an offence of another jurisdiction is well established in Irish law.
    The court looks to the alleged acts of the person sought as stated on the warrant and considers whether they would constitute an offence in this jurisdiction.

  30. In the cases of Ferenca9 and Desjatnikovs10this Court approved of this test in the context of EAWs.

    The learned High Court judge pointed out that the law in this State required a dishonest intent, he reviewed the facts on the warrant and held:-

    "…[the] facts do not seem to me to correspond to an offence of theft under s.4 given the absence of dishonest intent alleged in the factual background."

    Peart J. looked at the facts and acts alleged on the warrant, analysed whether they would constitute an offence in Ireland, and reached a conclusion. I would affirm the finding of the High Court that there is no corresponding offence.11
  31. On the basis of the foregoing, it is the “constituent elements,” 12 the “essential factual ingredients”13 of the offence in the requesting State that is of concern in assessing whether or not there is correspondence, subject to the rider that where the relevant alleged acts are committed in the State it is an offence here too.
  32. The ingredients of the common law offence that the prosecution will be required to prove are outlined in the warrant as:

    • The accused did some act or a series of acts which has a tendency to pervert the course of justice.
    • The accused did that act or that series of acts intending it to pervert the course of justice.
    • A course of justice had been embarked upon.
  33. On the assumption that the common law offence subsists in this jurisdiction and the same factual ingredients constitute that offence, it is necessary to examine the facts disclosed in the warrant to see if that which is alleged against the Appellant meets the statutory definition of an offence and “correspondence” so as to override the prohibition against surrender.
  34. The Oxford Dictionary definition of “pervert” is (1) to alter from an original meaning or state to a distortion of what was first intended. (2) Lead away from what is right, natural or acceptable.                  
    “Justice” is defined in the dictionary as “just behavior or treatment” or “the quality of being fair and reasonable” whereas “injustice” is defined as “a lack of justice” or “an unjust act or occurrence”.
  35. The surrender of the Appellant is sought, so that he can be put on trial in England, or so they claim, for posting packages in Ireland addressed, c/o the Court, to an English Judge and to the foreman of an English Jury. We know the packages contained nothing except DVDs but the only information provided in the warrant is that the video drew heavily from a BBC Panorama programme, the footage of which is widely available and the “thrust of the video” suggested that the alleged 7/7 bombers (not the three men on trial) were innocent.
  36. The affidavit of Sergeant Fallon supports the assertion that this was the genuine belief of the Appellant. There is nothing to suggest any intent or tendency to cause an injustice and despite the fact that at the request of the Appellant a copy of the DVD was tendered to the High Court and it was requested that it be viewed in the surrender proceedings, the DVD was not viewed by the High Court and accordingly the precise factual nature of the alleged offence is not readily apparent such that the High Court was not properly in a position to conclude that the alleged acts constituted an offence.
  37. It is maintained that the alleged act of sending a DVD containing an alternative thesis in which the Appellant firmly believed, does not have a tendency to “pervert” the course of justice. If there was no pre-determination, as is mandatory in a fair trial, there was nothing to alter. There is no suggestion that the Appellant wanted anything other than a result that was right, natural and acceptable. He believes the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocent and sent the DVDs as an Amicus Curiae Brief. There is nothing to suggest he made any assertions in relation to the persons on trial.
  38. The Appellant sought to rely on the DVD as evidence to support a lack of correspondence and prove that no crime was committed. This was indicated to the Court on a mention date in advance of the hearing and a court-room with DVD facilities was specially allocated for the hearing. However on the hearing date the Central Authority objected to the playing of the video on the premise that it might provide the Appellant with a platform for his opinions. In doing so the Minister clearly sought to breach the Appellant’s Constitutional Right to freely express his political opinion, which is contrary to the Minister’s sworn duty to uphold the Constitution, and that very same constitutionally-protected right that the Minister sought unconstitutionally to breach, for which the Minister should be fired.
    In the circumstances the Court declined to view the video at the hearing, but Peart J. stated that he would view it in private in the course of his deliberations. However, when delivering judgement, Peart J. stated that he had not viewed the video on the basis that to do so would “run the risk of entering upon the merits of the prosecution case” against the Appellant.              
    It is accepted that it is not for the Irish Courts to consider the strength of the prosecution case against the appellant (See Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform –v- Stafford, Supreme Court, 17th December 2009).  However, the Appellant’s argument here is that the Court is required to engage with the facts of this case in circumstances where correspondence is in issue.
  39. It is maintained that the Judge was in error in so concluding, firstly because the content of the DVD went to the very core of the assessment of correspondence. If the contents of the DVD did not disclose a tendency to pervert the course of justice, then no crime was committed and correspondence is not made out and surrender is prohibited. The High Court had a duty to investigate that matter as part of the surrender process and in that regard the merits of the prosecution case is highly relevant. If there is no factual basis to sustain an allegation of perversion of justice and/or intent towards that end, surrender is prohibited. The High Court was not entitled to curtail its enquiry in deference to the U.K. authorities, or to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
  40. Secondly, the Judge erred in determining that the DVD “obviously contained material which is believed by the [Appellant] to be at least relevant to the subject matter of the charges before the Crown Court, as otherwise he would not have sent it.” In the first instance that finding engages with the merits of the prosecution case and runs contrary to the Trial Judge’s reason for not viewing the video, and furthermore, in so far as it represents a determination that the Appellant committed the actus reus of the offence it does not factor into the equation the relevant mens rea, an intent to prejudice, an essential element of the offence and in respect of which the only evidence before the Court was the belief of the Appellant that the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocent. It is the absence of any of the requisite mens rea that proved fatal to “correspondence” in the Dyer case. In any event there was no basis for a conclusion that an “injustice” might have been caused, rather than an injustice being prevented. In that regard Peart J. erred as a matter of law in correlating influencing the “outcome” of a trial with the concept of “injustice”. In any event, the rationale of the High Court Judge amounted to supposition, ignored available factual ingredients and it was not a valid basis for concluding there was a crime or correspondence.
  41. Whereas in his judgement Peart J. quoted from Archbold at paragraph 28-15 to the effect that “any approach to a jury to discuss a case may amount to an attempt to pervert the course of justice” it is clear from that statement that not every approach will amount to such an attempt. Whether it does or does not will depend on the facts of the particular case. In the Mickleburgh case cited by Archbold there had been a number of discussions with and statements taken from a jury foreman concerning deliberations and votes by the jury. The House of Lords held that the leave of the Court would be required in such circumstances.   
    By contrast, in this instance the contents of the DVD represent the entirety of the attempted communication with the court, it does not tend to pervert justice and it is imperative that the DVD should have been viewed. In any event, there was no approach to or any engagement or discussion with the jury in this case. 
  42. Peart J. held that whereas certain DVDs might be sent to the jury without incurring liability, the DVD in this case is not regarded by the issuing judicial authority as being so benign. However, the issuing judicial authority in this case makes no such assertion.
    Of importance in this case is the failure to assert at any point in the European Arrest Warrant that there was an act which had (a) a tendency to pervert the course of justice or (b) that the Appellant did the act or acts intending it to pervert the course of justice. This is not asserted in any manner in the case. 
  43. As it happens in this case, the relevant acts were committed here, and thus if it is a “corresponding offence” then what it is alleged against the Appellant must also be an offence contrary to Irish law. As a corollary, if it is not an offence contrary to Irish law, it cannot be a “corresponding offence” and his surrender is prohibited.
    The Appellant maintains there was no crime and it is not a corresponding offence such that his surrender is prohibited by section 38 of the Act.
  44. Peart J. erred in law by allowing the Minister to submit the statement that, from the learned judge’s legal-experience, he must have known was a lie; for which the Minister should be charged with committing perjury; and the learned judge also erred by then accepting that lie into the hearing. That false statement/lie being that there is no definition in Irish law of perverting the course of justice. Perverting the course of justice, as the Minister MUST know, is clearly defined in the Irish Criminal Justice Act, 1999,

    Section 41. – (1) Without prejudice to any provision made by any other enactment or rule of law, a person –
    who harms or threatens, menaces or in any other way intimidates or puts in fear another person who is assisting in the investigation by the Garda Siochána of an offence or is a witness or potential witness or a juror or potential juror in proceedings for an offence, or a member of his or her family,
    with the intention thereby of causing the investigation or the course of justice to be obstructed, perverted or interfered with, shall be guilty of an offence.

  45. Peart J. erred in law by then allowing the Minister to build on that lie; that there is no definition in Irish law of perverting the course of justice; to introduce into the hearing, a different offence in English law, not Irish law: stating that we have to accept the English law, in an Irish court: that of attempting to influence a judge or jury. If it is a crime to attempt to influence a judge or jury, then every barrister and solicitor is guilty of that crime, in every case.
  46. Peart J. erred in law by allowing the Minister to advance this argument when it is based on a lie and it is a different offence from that with which the Appellant is charged, and now the Minister is at it again having subsequently introduced embracery (from 1360AD) and contempt of court, that appear nowhere in the EAW that is the subject of this case, as is required by law. Who is he serving?
  47. Peart J. erred by not viewing the contents of the 7/7 Ripple Effect DVD as requested and thereby seeing that the contents of the DVD, and the act of sending them, are not threatening, menacing, or in any way intimidating or fear inducing. Also that it contains nothing that would be to the detriment of public order, nor to public morality and it absolutely does not mention the 3 men who were on trial at Kingston Crown Court in 2008, in whose trial the Appellant is falsely and maliciously accused of trying to pervert the course of justice. It mentions 4 other men not accused of the crimes these 3 men were accused of. If Peart J. had viewed the contents, as was requested and he said he would do so, he would have seen that nothing in the contents, or the sending of the DVDs, corresponded with an offence in Irish law.
    If the four alleged 7/7 bombers were guilty, and a DVD proving their guilt had been sent, would the Appellant be facing this charge? No. Thus demonstrating their lack of impartiality, and that it is a politically-motivated malicious-prosecution.
  48. Peart J. erred in law by refusing to allow the Appellant to present his defence during the surrender proceedings.

    (v) Place of Commission

  49. Section 44 of the EAWA prohibits surrender if the offence alleged in the EAW was committed outside the issuing State unless the act or omission constitutes an offence here. Thus, as a pre-requisite to the making of a surrender order it is incumbent upon the Court to determine and be satisfied that there was an offence and it was committed in the issuing State. The Court did not and could not do so here. In such circumstances it is maintained that surrender is prohibited under Part 3 of the Act.

    Section 44:
    A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if the offence specified in the European arrest warrant issue in respect of him or her was committed or is alleged to have been committed in a place other than the issuing state and the act or omission of which the offence consists does not, by virtue of having been committed in a place other than the State, constitute an offence under the law of the State.
  50. In the High Court the Minister asserted that though often couched as “an attempt”, the offence in question here is not an inchoate offence, and the full offence is committed when the DVDs were posted. That is consistent with the substance of the charge “doing an act tending and intended to...” In the circumstances the offence specified in the European Arrest Warrant was not committed within the jurisdiction of the issuing state and surrender decision is governed by section 44.
  51. The learned Judge erred in law by deciding this issue and the case in general on the basis of a lie and a proposition of law and/or cases not raised or opened at the hearing and which the Appellant had no opportunity to address. Without prejudice to the foregoing the learned Judge erred by considering and applying the cases of Reg. –v- Doot [1973] AC 807 and DPP –v- Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 which concerned the offence of conspiracy and related to persons present in the territory of the U.K. during the currency of that conspiracy. There is no allegation of a conspiracy in this case much less any suggestion that a party to a conspiracy set foot in the U.K. jurisdiction during the currency of a conspiracy, a requirement of the case law upon which the High Court made its determination. In the absence of other precedent, the Appellant should have been afforded an opportunity to address this issue.
    Further the extra-territorial effect of criminal law must be clear and unambiguous as otherwise the effect is merely within the jurisdiction. The legislature has now given the offence of conspiracy extra-territorial effect by virtue of section 71 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.  Other offences have been given such extra-territorial effect in other Acts, see, for example, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2009. 
    There is no suggestion that the offence of perverting the course of justice, which itself is a little used offence in this jurisdiction, has any such extra-territorial effect.
  52. The surrender of the Appellant is prohibited and/or cannot be ordered because there was no offence committed and he was, at all times, outside the boundaries of the issuing State. Thus the precondition prescribed by the legislature is not satisfied and his surrender is prohibited by section 44 of the Act.  As this Court ruled in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform -v- Tobin14
    It follows that the High Court was neither entitled nor bound, on the basis of a correct interpretation of the relevant section to order the surrender of the respondent. It follows that his surrender cannot be ordered. 15


  53. The surrender of the Appellant is prohibited under the EAWA 2003 on the five distinct grounds. In the first instance the alleged acts of commission, the factual ingredients of the offence as outlined in the European arrest warrant do not correspond with an Irish offence. The factual matrix disclosed by the issuing judicial authority does not meet the definition of the charge under Irish law, “correspondence” is not satisfied and thus surrender is prohibited by section 38 of the Act.
    Secondly, all the acts and the completion of the alleged offence occurred in Ireland and thus if an offence was committed, it is punishable under Irish law and surrender is prohibited by section 44 of the Act.
    Furthermore, the act of posting a letter or package because one believes in the innocence of certain parties is a constitutionally protected freedom to hold an opinion and/or communicate a view, there is no legitimate basis for curtailing that right in deference to the justice system of another state. In that regard inter alia the surrender of the Appellant is prohibited by section 37 of the Act.
  54. The Appellant’s surrender and prosecution is also prohibited because He has Sovereign Immunity from prosecution and surrender, by virtue of, amongst other things, the “Preamble to the Irish Constitution”; Article 6.1; Article 31.4; Article 34.5.1 – “The Judge’s Oath”; Article 44.1 and thus the Minister of State and the State itself and any and all other states have no jurisdiction over the Appellant.


    Preamble to the Irish Constitution.

    In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all
    authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both
    of men and States must be referred,
    We, the people of Éire,
    Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine
    Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through
    centuries of trial, . . . .

    ARTICLE 6.1
    All powers of government, legislative, executive and
    judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right
    it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal,
    to decide all questions of national policy, according to
    the requirements of the common good.

    ARTICLE 31.4
    Every member of the Council of State shall at the first
    meeting thereof which he attends as a member take and
    subscribe a declaration in the following form:
    In the presence of Almighty God I, , do solemnly
    and sincerely promise and declare that I will faithfully
    and conscientiously fulfil my duties as a member of
    the Council of State.”

    ARTICLE 34.5.1
    Every person appointed a judge under this Constitution
    shall make and subscribe the following declaration:
    In the presence of Almighty God I, do solemnly
    and sincerely promise and declare that I will duly and
    faithfully and to the best of my knowledge and power
    execute the office of Chief Justice (or as the case may be)
    without fear or favour, affection or ill-will towards any
    man, and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws.
    May God direct and sustain me.”

    ARTICLE 44.1
    The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship
    is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in
    reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.

    ARTICLE 44.2.1
    Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion (the bonded obligation to obey God [our conscience] not men*) are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.

    * The Holy Bible, New Testament, Acts of the Apostles 5:29 Then Peter and the [other] Apostles answered and said, “We ought to obey God [our conscience] rather than men”.

  55. It follows that the Minister was not entitled to bring any charge against the Appellant, and the High Court was neither bound nor entitled to order the Appellant’s surrender. The Order for His surrender should not have been made. It is respectfully maintained that the decision of the High Court should be reversed. The appeal should be allowed and the Appellant discharged for the benefit and the safety of all of mankind.

    Also for the Record.

The Appellant finds it ironic, appalling and disgusting, that the Minister who swore a solemn oath before Almighty God to uphold the God-given and constitutionally-protected rights of the Appellant and everyone who believes in freedom and justice, who’s duty it is to God [their conscience] and their fellow-man to stand-up and speak truth to power in defence of that freedom and justice; instead of being presumed innocent; is being attacked and having vile, slanderous, blasphemous, evil accusations made against him for exercising those rights, by the very person (the Minister) who swore to uphold and defend those very same rights and duties, that the brave and honourable founders of this Irish Republic fought, bled and died for. The Minister is acting like a lick-spittle lackey of the evil criminal U.K. Nazi fascist police-state, instead of doing his duty of protecting the citizens of this country, as he solemnly swore to do. By so doing the Minister is breaking his oath of office and is therefore lawfully no longer the Minister with immediate-effect and should clear his desk and vacate his office, so that a more honourable and righteous man can take his place. He should not judge other people by his own evil standards and should be ashamed of himself.  Éireann go Brách.

Gospel of Luke 4:18 The Spirit of the Lord [is] upon me, because He hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; He hath sent me to heal the brokenhearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised,
4:19 To preach the acceptable year of the Lord (Isa. 61:1-3).
4:20 And he closed the Book, and he gave [it] again to the minister, and sat down. And the eyes of all them that were in the church were fastened on him.
4:21 And he began to say unto them, This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears.



The last page of the Holy Bible, Old Testament:-
Malachi 4:1 For, behold, the Day cometh, that shall burn like an oven; and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the "I AM" Lord of hosts, that it shall leave of them neither root nor branch (nothing).
4:2 But unto you that fear My name shall the Sun of Righteousness arise with healing in his wings; and ye shall go forth, and grow up as calves of the stall.
4:3 And ye shall tread down the wicked; for they shall be ashes under the soles of your feet in The Day that I shall do [this], saith the "I AM" Lord of hosts.
4:4 Remember ye and return to The Law of Moses My servant, which I commanded unto him in Horeb for all Israel, [with] the Statutes and Judgments (see Psalm 2:10, below).
4:5 Behold, I will send you Elijah the Prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful Day of the "I AM" (Sura 43:61):
4:6 And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse (for details of the curse, please see verse 1, above).
In plain English, that means that unless the Irish Nation repeals and ceases and desists  from enforcing ALL man-made legislation, including, but not limited to: Common Law and Precedents; man-made Statutes and Acts; European Union legislation; Canon Law; Roman Law; English Law, Talmudic Law and keeps and enforces ONLY the “I AM” God’s Laws, Statutes and Judgements; that We gave to Moses at Sinai and which are written in the five Books of Moses in the Holy Bible; and NO other, and listens to me, and acknowledges my Sovereignty and does EXACTLY as I say, my Father is going to burn all of your bodies to ashes, as He has clearly stated in Malachi ch. 4 above, and your souls (the REAL you) will spend eternity in the Lake of Fire and Brimstone, regretting it.

The choice is yours, so please take your time and choose EXTREMELY carefully.

Amen – So be it.

Now please study and live, “The Way home or face The Fire” – - the title of which is self-explanatory.

The King of kings’ Bible - Psalm 2

2:1 Why do the unenlightened rage, and the people imagine a futile thing?
2:2 The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the "I AM", and against His Anointed, (2 Esd. 13:34) [saying],
2:3 Let us break Their bonds asunder, and cast away Their cords from us.
2:4 He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall make fools of them.
2:5 Then shall He speak unto them in His wrath, and terrify them in His fury.
2:6 Yet have I set My King (to govern - Isa. 9:6-7) upon My Holy Hill of Gathering (Isa. 33:16; 2 Esd. 13:35).
2:7 I will declare the decree: the "I AM" hath said unto me, Thou [art] My Son; this day have I created for thee.
2:8 Ask of Me, and I shall give [thee] the unenlightened [for] thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth [for] thy possession.
2:9 Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel (Rev. 12:5).
2:10 Be wise now therefore, O ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth.
2:11 Serve the "I AM" with fear, and rejoice with trembling.
2:12 Kiss My Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish [from] The Way, when his wrath is kindled just a little (Luke 19:27). Blessed [are] all they that put their trust in him.

Now please study “On The Way To Emmaus Again” – - for further confirmation of who I REALLY am, and what this is really all about.

Right now you probably have two questions, the first being: Is he serious? The answer to that is: Yes. Absolutely.

The second question that logically follows from that is: Does he really expect us to believe that he is Christ? The answer to that is twofold and to answer the first part of it I will quote for you the Scripture that quotes what I said 2,000 years ago.

Luke 17:26 And as it was in the days of Noah, so shall it be also in the days of the Son of Man.
17:27 They did eat, they drank, they married wives, they were given in marriage, until the day that Noah entered into the ark, and the flood came, and destroyed them all.
17:28 Likewise also as it was in the days of Lot; they did eat, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded;
17:29 But the same day that Lot went out of Sodom it rained fire and brimstone from heaven, and destroyed [them] all.
17:30 Even thus shall it be in the day when the Son of Man is revealed.

In the days of Noah everyone wrongly thought he was insane, and very foolishly laughed at him, except for just seven members of his family, and EVERYONE else who disbelieved him was executed in The Flood. Only eight people out of the entire population of the Earth survived The Flood.

So that statement that I made 2,000 years ago means that only the people who believe and obey me will survive The Fire, and EVERYONE who chooses to disbelieve me will burn, which is completely in harmony with the other Scriptures that I have previously quoted.

So the first part of my answer to your second question: Do I really expect you to believe that I am Christ? The answer is: Yes. Absolutely.

And in reply to the second part of the twofold answer: Do I think that you will believe that I am Christ? The answer is: Probably not, as I already said so 2,000 years ago, and said what will happen to every single person who does not believe me and does not want me to rule over them.

My Father and I can’t make it any plainer than that.

So now it is up to you to decide the fate of not only yourselves, but the entire Irish Nation, which is why this had to come to the Irish Supreme Court.

Please choose wisely.


 Anthony John Hill
Christ - Rí na hÉireann* / Rex Mundi
King of kings and of the whole World




* Christ Rí na hÉireann – Ireland’s Destiny, for which Ireland, the Isle of Destiny, was given its name – Inis Fáil.


1 IESC 64

Our emphasis

Our emphasis

[2004] 1 IR 40

[1981] IR 489

[2004] 1 IR 40 at p 48 per Fennelly J.

Ibid at page 49. Our emphasis.

[2005] 2 IR 375 at page 380 per Denham J.

[2008] 4 I.R. 480

2009 1 I.R. 618

Ibid per Denham J. at 626.

Article 2 of the Framework Decision

  A.G. –v- Dyer [2004] 1 IR 40

[2008] IESC 3

Ibid per Fennelly J.





No. 143/09





  Anthony John Hill  








 Anthony John Hill, 
    [email protected]


HillSupremeCourtSubmissions11-c.doc173 KB
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